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ABSTRACT: One approach to science treats science as a cognitive
accomplishment of individuals and so defines a scientific community
as an aggregate of individual enquirers. Another treats science as a
fundamentally collective endeavor and so defines a scientist as a
member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been
offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two
approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the
social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot,
posing objections to the would-be rapprochement. We clarify both the
animosity and the tonic proposed to resolve it, ultimately arguing that
that worries raised by Toon and others are uncompelling.
KEYWORDS: science studies, distributed cognition, d-cog, SSK,
scientific knowledge, division of cognitive labor
Treating science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals,
we might define a scientific community as an aggregate of individual
enquirers. Contrariwise, treating science as a fundamentally collective
endeavor, we might define a scientist as a member of a scientific
community. The framework of distributed cognition has been heralded
as a way of doing both at once (e.g., by Ronald Giere in a series of
publications; 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006, 2007, 2013;
Giere&Moffatt, 2003). Adam Toon (2014) has recently posed
objections to this would-be rapprochement between the cognitive and
the social. Our aim is to clarify the issues and ultimately to show that
distributed cognition can deliver on its promise of hooking up cognitive
and social conceptions of science.
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In what follows, we use the phrase ‘d-cog’ instead of
‘distributed cognition’ as a reminder that this is a technical term of art
rather than just the composition of the usual words ‘distributed’ and
‘cognition’. There is still a question of how the term of art should be
understood, of course, and we adopt and argue for a specific criterion
below.

1 Framing the Debate
Toon does not give a clear characterization of either ‘d-cog’ or
of the ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ extremes which it is meant to reconcile.
Instead, he identifies them just by offering exemplars. Latour and
Woolgar (1986), for example, stand in for the social extreme. The
description of navigation teams given by Ed Hutchins (1995) stands in
for d-cog. Before considering Toon directly, we want to offer a more
detailed characterization both of d-cog and the tension it is meant to
resolve.

1.1 The cognitive and the social
Put modestly, Giere’s suggestion is that distributed cognition
provides “a way of overcoming some of the opposition that many have
felt between social and cognitive understandings of science” (Giere,
2006, p. 114). Put more boldly, it is that d-cog can provide “a
productive theoretical framework that all contributors to science
studies, including historians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists
and anthropologists, can share” (Giere, 2007, p. 319).
The cognitive approach is individualist and presumes that the
primary unit of analysis is the individual organism or thinker. This
presumption is sometimes just a visceral one; John Searle comments in
a recent interview, “it upsets me when I read the nonsense written by
my contemporaries, the theory of extended mind makes me want to
throw up” (Boag, 2013). It also stems from some common
methodologies. In philosophy, it can be traced to the tradition which
treats the task of epistemology as analyzing ‘S knows that P’ for an
individual knower S and some proposition P. Communities, which
typically go unmentioned, are made up of atomic individual Ss who
must each meet the condition for knowledge. In cognitive science, it
can come from the Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) approach which
attempts to model cognition entirely as software which runs inside an
individual organism, connected to the world by the inputs and outputs
of biological hardware.
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The social approach presumes that the real scientific action
happens in public. SSK, the sociology of scientific knowledge, is
typically offered as exemplary of the social approach. Some SSK
scholars express explicit hostility to epistemology. Latour and Woolgar
proposed setting it aside entirely and called for a “ten-year moratorium
on cognitive explanations of science” (1986, p. 280). Giere invokes
Latour explicity, and Toon calls the proposed moratorium “[p]erhaps
the clearest instance” of the cognitive/social divide (Toon, 2014,
p. 112).
Latour and Woolgar’s ten-year moratorium ended almost
twenty years ago, so one might suspect that invocations of it are just
dying echoes of the 1990s Science Wars. However, although the war is
over, recent discussions of science sometimes fall along the same battle
lines. For example, Philip Mirowksi writes in discussing the
commercialization of science:
…I want to set out some relatively tractable notions of “good
science,” starting from some aggregate measures, and then
ask what has happened to them. Philosophers have turned out
not very helpful in this regard, primarily acting as though
there abided generic benchmark characterizations of reliable
knowledge, meanwhile drawing the bulk of attention away
from the social conditions and structures that might improve
or degrade the process of validating or augmenting the
quality of knowledge. Perhaps even more disturbing, the
profession of science studies has become absorbed with the
prospect of “democratizing” science and diminishing the
power of expertise, to the neglect of considerations of the
degradation of the knowledge base that might possibly ensue
as a consequence of “opening up” science to various
constituencies. (Mirowski, 2011, p. 288)
Mirowski wants a way of thinking about what it would mean for the
scientific community to be operating well. He complains that
philosophers have talked too much about individual knowers, and
social theorists have nothing to say about cognitive accomplishments of
science. We might point to writers both in philosophy and science
studies who have done some of the work that Mirowski wants, but our
point is simply that he describes the two approaches which Giere
suggests d-cog can reconcile.
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1.2 Characterizing d-cog
For the sake of concreteness, we will start from a specific
criterion for d-cog given by Magnus (2007).1
It is standard, following David Marr (1982), to distinguish
levels of analysis. We distinguish the task of an activity from the
process that implements it. The task is given as “an abstract and
idealized specification of the behavior to be achieved” (McClamrock ,
1995, p. 20), situated in a context in which the behavior is specfied.
The process, by contrast, is given by the actual local mechanisms and
procedures which accomplish the behaviors in that context. Applied to
one of Marr’s examples (1982, pp. 22–33): Tallying the total cost of
your purchases is the task accomplished by a cash register. The way
numbers are representated in the cash register and the physical circuitry
are both part of the process.2
Now we can say that an activity is ‘d-cog’ if (a) the task is one
that we would consider cognitive if it were performed within a single
individual and if (b) the process extends beyond the individual.
(Magnus, 2007, p. 300) This has the virtue of applying clearly to
exemplars of d-cog and generalizing well to other cases. For example,
adding sums in your head is a paradigm cognitive activity, so using a
cash register to tally large sums counts as d-cog. Before moving on, we
take up several objections that have been raised against this criterion.
First, a single system can be characterized in different ways
relative to different task specifications. Hyundeuk Cheon objects to this
account that “task-specification relativity is hardly justified” and “taskspecification relativity leads to the relativity of cognition, thus making
cognition so superficial” (Cheon, 2013). Cheon’s worry only makes
sense if we think that ‘System S is d-cog’ must be a well-defined
monadic predicate. We suggest instead that it should be understood
instead as a relation ‘System S is d-cog for task T’.
Second, as we readily acknowledge, there is no single task
which is performed by cognition simpliciter (Magnus, 2007, p. 307).
So Cheon objects, “We may therefore ask why [Magnus] demands the
specification of the task only for distributed cognition, but does not for
undistributed cognition” (Cheon, 2013). This objection misunderstands
1

The criterion given by Magnus (2007), although advocated there
by just one of us, is posed in terms of a distinction that had earlier
been articulated by the other of us (McClamrock, 1991; 1995).
2
Note that this takes both Marr’s algorithm and implementation to
be aspects of the process.
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the suggestion. There may be no general way of characterizing a task
which is performed by all cognition simpliciter, but particular instances
of cognition — distributed or not — must have particular tasks. For
example, when a person calculates a sum in her head, the task is to
perform addition. So cognition simpliciter is also a relation, something
of the form ‘System S implements the cognitive task T’. Undistributed
cognition is the special case where the system is entirely within a single
thinking individual.
Note that task-relativity is not an ad hoc peculiarity of d-cog
explanation. For all kinds of systems, structures often have multiple
functions with respect to different tasks. To take a non-cognitive
example, bird feathers contribute both to flight and to temperature
regulation. Understanding and assessing birds requires recognizing the
separate tasks that their feathers perform. To take a homey cognitive
example, imagine someone who is panicking because they are afraid of
the dark and who attempts to calm themselves by reciting
multiplication tables. Treating their recitation as a performance of the
task calculating products misses important aspects of what is going on,
namely that it is also directed at the task controlling attention and heart
rate.
Third, Cheon suggests that the account conflates notions of
‘distributed cognition’ and ‘extended cognition’ which have different
motivations and different consequences. As Cheon has it, “extended
cognition performs some tasks that one individual, in principle can
perform” whereas “distributed cognition” pursues “goals that one
human agent cannot solely achieve” (Cheon, 2013).3 If this is supposed
to mean that d-cog must have goals which could not even in principle
be carried out by an individual: We do not know what tasks Cheon has
in mind, but we worry that they would only count as ‘cognitive’ in
some contentious sense. A collective accomplishment which is nothing
like what an individual thinker could achieve is ipso facto not
something akin to thought. If Cheon means instead to say that d-cog
3

Hutchins (2014) uses the phrase “distributed cognition” to mean a
methodological approach which analyzes cognition in terms of the
interaction between separate functional elements, even if all of the
functional components are contained inside a single organism. Our
characterization of d-cog explicitly requires distribution beyond the
boundary of an organism, because we are especially interested in
understanding science. For our purposes, what is crucial is
precisely the involvement of instruments and communities of
people.
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must as a practical matter be something that cannot be done by one
individual: We readily admit that a great many cognitive tasks are
impossible for any human to do in their head because of basic limits
like brain size, but nevertheless we can recognize the tasks as ones that
are cognitive. For example, there is a limit to the size of arithmetic
calculations that a given material brain can perform, but performing
larger calculations still counts as a cognitive task. If my task is adding a
long series of numbers, the pad of paper or calculator I use is a critical
part of my task solution, such that I could not do the task in the same
way (and maybe not even at all) without such a tool. If Cheon allows
that a large enough paper-and-pencil calculation counts as distributed
cognition, then it seems natural to also count a smaller calculation
which I could perhaps have done in my head when I actually opt to
carry it out longhand.4
Fourth, one might worry d-cog entails the existence of extended
minds in a metaphysically thick sense of mind. In Clark’s way of
putting it, extended cognition is the view that “the actual local
operations that realize certain forms of human cognizing include
inextricable tangles… of brain, body, and world. The local mechanisms
of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head” (Clark, 2008, p.
xxviii). This can be taken to mean that parts of the world outside the
organism not only contribute to the content of cognition but also bear
mental properties. There has been prominent and healthy debate over
this thesis. (Clark, 2008; Adams & Aizawa, 2008) For our current
purposes, however, we need not take a stance in that debate. Much
ballyhooed questions about mind are not our target. For something to
be d-cog, it suffices that the mechanisms underlying someone’s ability
to accomplish cognitive tasks are in part outside that person’s body.
Extended mind, read in a strong way, is the additional claim that at
4

One might wonder about the relation between d-cog and embedded
cognition — the view that, as Rupert puts it, “cognitive processes
depend heavily, and in hitherto unexpected ways, on
organismically external properties and devices, and on the structure
of the external environment in which the cognition takes place”
(2004, p. 393). The central claim of both is that mechanisms,
objects, and structures instantiated outside the body are often
critical supporting networks to the task accomplished in cognition.
If one reads embedded cognition as something that happens inside
the organism but requires the external structure as props, then it is a
somewhat more conservative view. Alternately, one might read
embedded cognition as d-cog.
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least some of those mechanisms are also constitutive of the person
having a mind or at least a mind of a certain sort.
Fifth, some authors think it is important to distinguish
distributed cognition which distributes the process across props and
tools from distributed cognition which distributes the process across
several individuals. If one begins by wondering about the boundaries of
one’s own mind, one might be interested in the way that instruments
extend one’s abilities but not in the way other people do. The other
people, after all, have their own minds. So one could characterize
distribution in a way which only allows there to be one thinker at the
center of it. Contrariwise, Giere allows distributed cognition to involve
more than one person. Yet he requires it to involve tools and
instruments, counting cognition which includes multiple people but no
tools as mere ‘collective cognition’ (Giere, 2007). We do not make
either restriction, but rather intend d-cog as the broader and more
inclusive category including both variants. Although tools may be
crucial to some d-cog explanations, others are predominantly social. In
order to understand how science as a social endeavor can do cognitive
work, it is precisely the involvement of so many people — where none
of them has the whole scheme in their own mind — that is crucial. So
we neither require instruments nor preclude other people being
involved in d-cog. We insist that the process which implements d-cog
will include something outside the individual organism, but those
outside contributors might be other people, things, or both. Just as we
are agnostic on the question of whether a d-cog system of individual
with a smartphone has an extended mind, we are agnostic as to whether
a scientific team has some kind of hive mind.
Sixth, and finally, some authors have argued that a definition of
d-cog should be broader than this criterion. For example, Matthew
Brown (2011) suggests moving beyond the task/process distinction to a
tri-fold distinction between operations, actions, and activities. So a
system S might be d-cog qua activity system, without specifying any
further terms. He concludes provocatively, “presumably, I am some
kind of cognitive system, even though I am not built to carry out one
specific and well-bounded task, even though my cognitive activities
evolve, and aren’t always as well-bounded as certain cognitive theories
might presuppose” (Brown, 2011, p. 28). Note, however, that Brown’s
alternative has not been developed in any detail. We worry about
whether it can be applied in a clear way to substantive cases.5
5

We have the same worry about Cheon’s (2013) positive definition,
which includes many unexplicated jargon terms: “cognitive
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Regardless, the objection is only that the conception is too narrow —
not that it is too lax. The worry misses its mark, since the condition is
not a definition but only a sufficient condition (Magnus, 2007, p. 300).
A sufficient condition, even if it does not exhaust the phenomena, is
enough to positively diagnose cases of d-cog. If some more expansive
definition could be elaborated and fruitfully employed, it would
encompass both the cases we discuss below and more besides.
Having cleared this ground, let’s turn to Toon’s objections.

2 Toon’s challenge
Adam Toon (2014) raises three kinds of problems for d-cog.
Here are the three problems, briefly. We consider each at greater length
in subsequent sections.
1. A d-cog description may explain how a task is performed but not
why it is performed.
2. A d-cog description is only contingently social, whereas many social
theorists insist that science is essentially social.
3. A d-cog description is cognitive only in a technical sense of
‘cognitive’, not in the pretheoretic sense that frames the opposition
between the social and the cognitive.

2.1 Why the task is performed
Toon points out that a d-cog description of some cognitive
activity does not explain why the activity was performed. Hutchins’
analysis of navigation describes the activities of a ship’s crew and can
explain why particular elements of the navigation cycle happen as they
do (for example, why the plotter draws a particular line on a map). Yet
it cannot explain why the whole cycle occurs at all or even, in Toon’s
view, help to account for such matters.
We argue that Toon’s reasons for this depend on misconstruing
the three-level analysis that he inherits from Marr and Hutchins. As
originally posed by Marr, the analysis separates the computational
theory (concerned with “the goal of the computation, why is it
appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be
outputs” which result from “coordinated information processing”
and the propagation of “semantic information”. Although the
phrases use familiar English words, we do not have a precise
enough understanding of them to apply the definition to cases.
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carried out”), the account of representation and algorithm (which asks
“How can this computational theory be implemented? In particular,
what is the representation for the input and output, and what is the
algorithm for the transformation?”), and hardware implementation
(concerned with “How can the representation and algorithm be realized
physically?”) (Marr, 1982, p. 25).6
Toon applies this distinction in a way that inappropriately
seems to undermine d-cog. In his characterization, “d-cog is a claim
about what happens at the implementation level of a computation”, by
describing how its physical implementation might be distributed in the
physical world, and “it is in this sense that d-cog offers a means of
integrating cognitive and social factors”. Because he takes d-cog
analysis to just be about hardware implementation, Toon thinks it “will
not tell us why a particular computation is being performed or why a
specific representational system is being used to carry it out” and that
“d-cog analysis… will not tell us how a representational system gains
its representational status.” So he claims that d-cog “cannot help to
reconcile debate between” social and cognitive answers to such
questions (Toon, 2014, p.117).
However, showing how activities are d-cog is a matter of
showing facts about not only implementation but about representation
and algorithm as well. The analysis of the division of labor in
navigation is not only about what physical things play various roles,
but is even more centrally about how the process that accomplishes the
task is divided into a set of cooperating sub-procedures and exchanges
of information — that is, the representations and algorithms for
accomplishing the task of navigation. Such analyses of information
processing within the system, rather than exclusively hardware
implementation descriptions, are just the sort of things that in turn
inform and illuminate the content-level questions that should be
addressed at the level of task. (McClamrock, 1995) Contra Toon, much
of a d-cog analysis will “concern the choice of representational scheme
used to carry out a computation” rather than merely “the way that the
computation is implemented”; cf. (Toon, 2014, p.117). So the broader
questions may well be at least partially answered within the d-cog
framework.
6

Ultimately, the three ‘level’ analysis must be adjusted to account
for different perspectives on various levels of organization of
complex systems; see McClamrock (1991). As David Danks put it,
Marr’s three levels conflate “a multidimensional space of
theoretical commitments” (2013, p. 2129).
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Of course there are limitations, but d-cog explanations are no
different than traditional cognitive explanations in this regard. Consider
David Danks’ criticism of rational analyses which explain an agent’s
input or output in terms of its solving a particular task in a specified
environment (2008). Such analyses do not ultimately explain the
agents’ input and output, Danks notes, because they do not explain how
the agent developed so as to employ the optimal strategy. Showing how
the task is functional does not show how it came to be undertaken. This
is only a problem for the d-cog approach if broader context would
involve incompatible descriptions in social or in cognitive terms, so
that the tension between the two returns. A broader analysis will
necessarily be something further, but it may also be d-cog. The
navigation cycle determines the position of the ship, and position
information is used in various ways in the broader operation of the
ship. Using different task analyses of the activity makes it possible to
situate it in these broader contexts. The navigation cycle occurs to
determine the present position of the ship, which is used to plot the
movement of the ship over time for purposes of navigation and
planning. Those tasks figure in the life of the ship, which is a unit in the
navy, which in turn is a strategic instrument of the nation. The regress
of explanation must come to a stop somewhere, because we only
follow it as far as our explanatory interests require and our abilities
allow, but that alone will not drive a wedge between the cognitive
against the social. If we persist in asking why questions about each
broader element, we will eventually reach a point where d-cog
explanations break down — but we will also reach a point where
neither social nor cognitive explanations are available.

2.2 Whether science is essentially social
Toon points out that a d-cog description makes social processes
logically contingent. For scholars who prefer social explanations, Toon
suggests, science being social is essential and logically necessary. So a
d-cog description would not satisfy them.
Stated in this way, it is not much of an objection. Admittedly, dcog alone does not and should not absolutely necessitate social
distribution of the tasks among multiple agents. Yet the centrality of
social distribution to the activity and task of gaining scientific
knowledge is what we should expect, given our cognitive limits and
social natures — facts about us which are in principle contingent, but
deeply general and entrenched. Because of the kinds of creatures we
are, we cannot really do science without working together. So science’s
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being a social enterprise is practically indispensable for us. The mere
logical possibility of an epistemic angel who does science alone in its
own mind is too abstruse to matter for understanding science as a thing
that finite creatures do. Science as socially distributed cognition is a
variety of d-cog, not something in conflict with it.
Toon presses the point by observing that d-cog explanation does
not explain how d-cog systems have representational content (that is,
how they come to have meaning). The d-cog explanation can describe
the operation of social and material representations, but it “leaves open
the question of how those representations come to represent the world.”
He adds that “this is a question that receives very different answers
from social and cognitive accounts of science. For example, members
of the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of science
propose a theory of meaning known as finitism, drawn from the later
Wittgenstein” (Toon, 2014, p. 118).
In reply, it is important to consider why the social nature of
science is important to thinkers like those in the Edinburgh school. On
closer inspection, their reasons to insist that science is social are not
reasons to quarrel with d-cog. David Bloor, one of the architects of the
Edinburgh school and the strong program, explicitly rejects the division
between the cognitive and the social. The division reflects what Bloor
calls “the ‘distortion’ model”, i.e. “the traditional rationalist dichotomy
between the rational and the social” (1991, p. 169). The distortion
model only allows for a weak sociology of knowledge, because social
factors would only be factors distorting rather than contributing to
knowledge. Such a weak program is just what the strong program is
defined against.7
Still, Toon is right that the strong program takes the social
nature of science to be essential. Bloor writes that “our best and most
cherished scientific achievements could not exist as they do without
having the character of social institutions” (1991, p. 164). Bloor argues
for this by imagining several separate people who look at the same
measurements and infer “their own personal version of Boyle’s Law.”
The solipsist-scientists would not yet have “Boyle’s Law as we know
it”, however, because they would not have “a scientific community
with a shared body of knowledge” (Bloor, 1991, p. 168). The
community having a publicly available theory as a shared object is
different than each individual having private representations which just
happen to coincide. However, this strikes us as entirely compatible
7

Bloor himself expresses the opposition in these term, e.g. (Bloor,
1991, p. 165).
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with d-cog explanations. There would be some commonality between
the two cases (insofar as the imagined personal versions of Boyle’s
Law and actual public versions of Boyle’s Law can both count as
versions of Boyle’s Law in some sense) but there is the deeply
important difference between them (insofar as one is the imagined feat
of an almost inhuman private cognition and the other is the actual
product of human d-cog).
Finally, some of the apparent disagreement is just
terminological, because parties define ‘knowledge’ in different ways.
The Edinburgh school defines ‘knowledge’, as distinct from individual
belief, in collective terms. Bloor writes: “Of course knowledge must be
distinguished from mere belief. This can be done by reserving the word
‘knowledge’ for what is collectively endorsed” (1991, p. 5). Steven
Shapin writes similarly that “the very idea of knowledge implicates a
public and shared commodity, to be contrasted with the individual’s
state of belief” (1996, p. 106). If knowledge must be social simply as a
matter of definition, then so too for scientific knowledge qua
knowledge.8 Epistemologists who define ‘knowledge’ differently are
disagreeing about how to use words rather than about substance.9 It
seems to us that d-cog is independent of these matters. It is compatible
with both collectivist and individualist definitions of ‘knowledge’, and
so with the collective nature of ‘scientific knowledge’ being necessary
8

In addition to SSK, Toon mentions the work of Helen Longino. He
writes, “Similar claims are also found in the work of authors
outside SSK. For example, Longino writes that science is
‘necessarily social’ ” (2014, p. 120). In the passage he cites,
Longino argues that “the development of knowledge is a
necessarily social rather than individual activity” (Longino, 1990,
p. 12). Here the terminological difference seems especially acute.
Longino offers several definitions of ‘knowledge’, all of which
include the community as an explicit term (Longino, 2002,
pp. 135–140).
9
Note that the issue can be made substantive by combining an
individualist definition of knowledge with the requirement that
cognitive activity yield knowledge. For example, Giere (2013)
insists that science must yield human knowledge for an individual.
Krist Vaesen (2011) argues that this risks allowing any d-cog
analysis to be refigured in individual terms. Although our
sympathies lie with Vaesen, d-cog as we understand it is
compatible with either Giere or Vaesen being right.
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by definition or merely necessary given deep facts about the kinds of
creatures we are.

2.3 What sense of ‘cognitive’ is in play
Toon objects that d-cog is only ‘cognitive’ in a technical sense.
It does not mean, for example, the thinkings of a mind. Indeed, its
status as a term of art was our motivation for adopting the abbreviation
‘d-cog’ in the first place. Yet, Toon suggests, scholars who prefer
cognitive explanations do so for some ordinary sense of ‘cognitive’. So
there is a possible gap between the cognitive explanations they want
and the explanations d-cog provides.
There are several possible answers to the criticism.
First, the gap could be closed by adopting a much extended
conception of mind, so that all cognition would be permeated by
external and social mechanisms. The revolutionary conception of mind
would comfortably take in d-cog. As we explained above, however, we
adopt an anodyne conception of d-cog and remain agnostic with respect
to deeper issues in the metaphysics of cognition and mind.
Second, a parallel problem arises for any technical jargon. We
can ask, for example, whether the epistemologist ends up saying
anything which applies to ‘knowledge’ in an ordinary sense. The mere
possibility of a mismatch is a general feature of philosophical
explication. So what?
Third, for any d-cog which meets the criterion we defended in
section 1.2, there is a more direct answer. The criterion for d-cog is
silent as to whether or not an operation of a community is cognitive
simpliciter, but the task must be one which would count as ‘cognitive’
in the ordinary sense if it were carrying out just in an individual
thinker. So, although the d-cog system might not strictly-speaking be
cognitive — depending on your view on extended as opposed to merely
embedded mind — the characterization has a built-in connection to the
ordinary conception of cognition.
It remains to be shown that d-cog which meets this criterion
will do the work of reconciling the cognitive and the social. In the next
section, we illustrate one way that it can by looking at recent research
on the division of cognitive labor.10

10

Other examples given by Magnus (2007) include the machinery in
a carpentry shop and double-blind clinical trials.
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3 D-cog at work
Consider scientists working together to discover what the world
is like.
If we focus only on individual cognition, scientists’ tasks are
specific ones about experimental design, data collection, analysis —
and even more quotidian things like filling out paperwork. Putting all
that into soft focus, writers in the epistemology literature tend to
privilege a broader individual task: Evaluate the theoretical possibilities
so as to believe the theory most likely to be true.
If we retain the broad perspective but focus on the community,
then the collective task might be something like: Explore the space of
possibilities so that all are sufficiently interrogated. This may not be
something that is done well by each scientist pursuing their own
personal, epistemic good. One individual only has limited resources;
she sets up a lab with some particular equipment, she only has finite
time and attention, etc. So different individuals might believe in
different theories and approaches, pursuing them independently.
Exploring new possibilities needs to be balanced against further
articulating established approaches. This would be difficult for a single
scientist to do simply in her own work, but it can be solved at the
community level by having a mixed community of more conservative
and more adventurous scientists. Most scientists should work within
the dominant approach, both because it has a proven track record of
problem-solving and because its success relies on their cooperating to
advance it. Yet some scientists should pursue novel approaches, even
though most of those will be dead ends. This point was seen clearly by
Thomas Kuhn. In the 1969 postscript to The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, he writes that
individual variability in the application of shared values may
serve functions essential to science. The points at which
values must be applied are invariably also those at which
risks must be taken. Most anomalies are resolved by normal
means; most proposals for new theories do prove to be
wrong. If all members of a community responded to each
anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each new theory
advanced by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the
other hand, no one reacted to anomalies or to brand-new
theories in high-risk ways, there would be few or no
revolutions. (Kuhn, 2012, pp. 185–6)
So this explanation was available to all of the parties to the Science
Wars, even if its implications were not recognized. Kuhn himself
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simply employs the idea to motivate thinking of scientific desiderata as
values rather than rules.
Since Kuhn, this has come to be called the division of cognitive
labor. Michael Weisberg (2010) and Ryan Muldoon (2013) distinguish
three approaches in the recent literature.
First: the marginal contribution/reward approach exemplified
by the work of Philip Kitcher (1990; 1993, ch. 8). Scientists are
modeled as self-interested agents after the fashion of models in
classical economics. Without any central planning, a reward structure
which pays scientists for making discoveries can cause them to divide
between mining the established approach and exploring novel
approaches. The established approach is more likely to pay off, but
with so many scientists on the job it is less likely to payoff for any
particular individual than a speculative approach.
Second: the epistemic network approach exemplified by the
work of Kevin Zollman (2010). Scientists are modeled as only having
partial information about what other scientists are doing, and they
pursue various approaches because of what seems appropriate given
their limited information. It is possible for this community arrangement
to achieve better outcomes than if each scientist was always fully
informed. Zollman concludes, “Looking at these scientists from the
perspective of individualistic epistemology, one might be inclined to
criticize the scientists’ behavior. However, when viewed as a
community, their behavior becomes optimal” (2010, p. 33).
Third: the epistemic landscape approach exemplified by work
of Weisberg and Muldoon (2009). It models the space of possible
approaches as a landscape and scientists as either mavericks (who
eagerly push out to new regions of the landscape) or followers (who go
where others have had the most success). This is a formal version of
Kuhn’s idea that some scientists will explore new possibilities
aggressively while others will stick to the established way of doing
things.
All of these approaches are recognizably socially-distributed
varieties of d-cog. An individual might divide their time and attention
between exploring different approaches, but it is impractical for this to
actually be done within an individual. A scientist spends time
developing the skills suited to one approach or another, and their
enthusiasm and effectiveness may depend on not dividing their
attention. There are also material as well as psychological constraints.
A scientist equips their lab for particular approaches and cannot mount
parallel labs in which they would pursue other approaches. So the
problem of dividing attention becomes a social problem of dividing
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labor. The cognitive task is implemented not in the work of a single
universal scientist but across a community of scientists.
The example also underscores the task-relativity of d-cog.
Above, we characterized the task as exploring the space of possible
theories. That is something that an individual might try to do, although
it is better done by a community. Once it is approached as a collective
enterprise, one might consider the task to be determine the optimal
distribution of labor. Too, this might be attempted by a single
individual — a central planner assigning scientists to various tasks. The
upshot of the literature on the distribution of cognitive labor is that it is
better to configure the community so that individuals arrive at
something near an optimal distribution without such central planning.
Finally, one might characterize the task as something like
distribute the cognitive labor. That is obviously not something that a
single individual could do. A partitioned mind which could function as
a community of individuals would just be a community, rather than an
individual. Yet the former two task specifications do describe
important aspects of science, and the process which implements those
tasks makes it d-cog.

4 Conclusion
By giving examples of substantive and rewarding analyses of
the scientific community as solving what are recognizably cognitive
problems with solutions which meet the criterion for d-cog, we have
deflected the last of Toon’s worries. Contra Toon, d-cog does not sneak
by with some ersatz sense of ‘cognition’.
At the outset, we noted that the promise of d-cog can be
understood in a more modest or in a more bold way.
The modest promise was that d-cog would provide “a way of
overcoming some of the opposition that many have felt between social
and cognitive understandings of science” (Giere, 2006, p. 114). A
worked example, like the literature on the division of scientific labor, is
sufficient to fulfill that promise. It shows how social organization can
be understood as doing epistemic work.
The bold promise was that d-cog would provide “a productive
theoretical framework” (Giere, 2007, p. 319). This is a harder promise
to discharge, because it is forward looking. Whether a present research
program will be productive and rewarding is something to be judged in
retrospect, by future scholars. It is a programmatic commitment,
namely that d-cog looks promising. For this, there is little value in
characterizing d-cog in a metaphysical way which stymies application
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to cases. A readily applicable conception of d-cog — like the one we
have defended — is most useful.
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